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Unbundling Populism 
David Fontana
ABSTRACT
Populism is having its moment on our constitutional center stage, but the way we are treating this 
moment is adding to the risks that populism poses to our liberal democratic constitutional order. 
Populism has primarily been defined in our public discussions by the loudest self-identifying 
populists active in democratic politics at the moment.  Populism has therefore often been treated as 
a bundled-together concept, merging not just antiestablishment sentiments, but also authoritarian 
and xenophobic ones as well.  Populism is an eight-letter word that is then treated like a pejorative 
four-letter one.  Populism, though, is a they, and not an it.  The antiestablishment part of populism 
can be empirically and logically unbundled from its authoritarian and xenophobic dimensions. 
Defining populism by treating it as featuring authoritarian and racist elements delegitimizes 
antiestablishment populism by associating it with these abhorrent features, while at the same time 
legitimizing these abhorrent features by labeling them populist. 
AUTHOR
Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University School of Law.  My thanks to the editors 
at the UCLA Law Review for generating and sponsoring this symposium, and to Jon Michaels for 
helping to organize it and including me in it.  For comments on this draft, my thanks to Rosalind 
Dixon, Stephen Gardbaum, Tom Ginsburg, David Pozen, David Schleicher, Naomi Schoenbaum, 
Louis Michael Seidman, Christopher Slobogin, and Peter Smith.
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INTRODUCTION 
On January 22, 2017—two days after the inauguration of Donald J. Trump 
as the President of the United States—the Cambridge Dictionary reported a 
dramatic spike in searches for the word “populism.”1  In April and May of 2017, 
Marine Le Pen of the French National Front performed the best in presidential 
elections of any populist candidate in the history of postwar French politics.2  In 
September of 2017, a far-right populist party entered the German Parliament 
for the first time in over sixty years.3  Hungary’s Fidesz4 and Poland’s Law and 
Justice (PiS) parties have been in power for several years now and have 
undermined core features of their liberal democratic constitutional traditions.5  
These are just a few examples of what the Cambridge Dictionary recognized at 
the end of 2017: Populism was the word of the year.6 
Populism is not just a word in the news, but a word with particular 
normative baggage.  There are eight letters in the word, but it is framed as a 
four-letter word.  Populism is being treated not just as a defining and different 
term, but as an idea that threatens the liberal democratic constitutional order.  
Scholars have been debating populism for decades, but a new burst of 
important scholarship has revived the concept in light of events in the past few 
years.7 
1. See Cambridge Dictionary’s Word of the Year in 2017, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY (Nov. 29, 
2017), https://dictionaryblog.cambridge.org/2017/11/29/cambridge-dictionarys-word-of-
the-year-2017 [https://perma.cc/72Z3-7MLR]. 
2. See Alissa J. Rubin, Macron Decisively Defeats Le Pen in French Presidential Race, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/07/world/europe/emmanuel-
macron-france-election-marine-le-pen.html (noting that “[t]he vote was a record for the 
National Front,” and thereby for all populist parties in postwar France). 
3. See Steven Erlanger & Melissa Eddy, Angela Merkel Makes History in German Vote, But So 
Does Far Right, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/24/ 
world/europe/germany-election-merkel.html. 
4. See Patrick Kingsley, As West Fears the Rise of Autocrats, Hungary Shows What’s Possible, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/world/europe/ 
hungary-orban-democracy-far-right.html. 
5. See Editorial Board, E.U. Reminds Poland How A Democracy Acts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/opinion/eu-poland-democracy-vote.html.
6.  See Cambridge Dictionary’s Word of the Year in 2017, supra note 1. 
7. For some examples, see JOHN B. JUDIS, THE POPULIST EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT 
RECESSION TRANSFORMED AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS (2016), STEVEN LEVITSKY & 
DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018), CAS MUDDE & CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA 
KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2017), JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, 
WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016), Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional
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This Article argues that the problem with populism right now is the pop-
ulists.8  Populism is primarily defined in our public discussions by the loudest 
populists active in democratic politics at the moment.  Populism has therefore 
often been treated as a bundled-together concept merging not just anti-
establishment sentiments, but also authoritarian and xenophobic sentiments.9  
Populism, though, is a they, and not an it.  The more that scholars permit populism 
to be defined mostly—and even exclusively—by figures like Donald J. Trump 
or Marine Le Pen, the more conceptual problems scholars will face. 
But the problem is deeper than that.  As one scholar has written, 
“[p]opulism seems to become stronger the more intellectuals criticize it.”10  
Labeling antiestablishment arguments with the same word that we use to 
describe authoritarians and bigots generates political harms for democratic 
citizens.  It allows an ideology to be tainted by a subset of ideologists trying to 
appropriate it.  The intellectual and popular energy that is dedicated to 
criticizing a narrow and isolated Establishment is undermined because the only 
word we have to describe it is the same word we use to describe figures like 
Trump and Le Pen.  Respectable populists are therefore tainted because they 
share the p-word with abhorrent populists.  At the same time, using a concept 
that does describe ideas with some intellectual merit to describe figures like 
Trump and Le Pen legitimates threatening figures and their threatening ideas. 
Part I identifies and defines two versions of populism.  The first, unbundled 
populism, relies on a basic definition of political claims-making that a large 
number of ordinary citizens are being excessively and unjustly disempowered by 
Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78 (2018), and Aziz Z. Huq, The People Against the 
Constitution, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1123 (2018) (reviewing MÜLLER, supra). 
8. For a helpful attempt to discover this argument in the landmark work of Richard 
Hofstadter, see Joshua Zeitz, Historians Have Long Thought Populism Was a Good Thing. 
Are They Wrong?, POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/ 
2018/01/14/trump-populism-history-216320 [https://perma.cc/VBP5-U9R6] (“Hofstadter’s 
problem wasn’t with Populism (capital P) as much as it was with populist movements
(small p), more generally.”). 
9. For examples of this definition of populism, see CAS MUDDE, POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT 
PARTIES IN EUROPE passim (2007); Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and 
the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash 6 (Harvard Kennedy 
Sch., Working Paper No. 16-026, 2016), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/ 
getFile.aspx?Id=1401 [https://perma.cc/SV3V-Z9VK] (noting the predominant sense in 
the academic literature that a “populist philosophy is a loose set of ideas that share three 
core features: anti-establishment, authoritarianism, and nativism”).  See generally J. Eric 
Oliver & Wendy M. Rahn, Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election, 667 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 189 passim (2016) (using this definition of populism to 
test it empirically). 
10. Pierre-André Taguieff, Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to 
a Real Problem, 103 TELOS 9, 43 (1995).
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a narrow and largely disconnected and unsympathetic elite.  The second, bundled 
populism, adds to the basic framework of a disempowered people battling an 
unjust elite with several other conditions.  In addition to political claims that pit 
average citizens against elites, it includes authoritarian and xenophobic claims.  
Scholars have not only rushed to label bundled populism as a form of populism, 
but increasingly as the only form of populism.  Part II argues that the hostility to 
established power sources featured in unbundled populism can be separated out 
from the intolerance towards others that bundled populism says inevitably 
follows and deserves the label populism.  Not only can unbundled populism be 
disaggregated from bundled populism, it must.  Otherwise, scholars will corrupt 
legitimate forms of populism, and legitimate corrupt forms of populism. 
I. UNBUNDLED AND BUNDLED POPULISM 
Populism generally refers to arguments pitting a large number of average 
people unjustly disempowered relative to and against some power elite.11  The 
Cambridge Dictionary that made populism the word of the year in 2017 defined 
it as, in substantial part, “political ideas and activities that are intended to get 
the support of ordinary people by giving them what they want.”12  The power 
elite can be an elite that exists across many different sectors of society.  The 
people can be struggling to claim power from a political elite of political leaders 
and parties, a legal elite of judges and lawyers, an economic elite of bankers, a 
media elite of journalists—each acting separately or together.13  The basic claim 
is in many ways a classic Madisonian one: “The accumulation of all 
powers . . . in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition 
of tyranny.”14 
But this claim comes in two materially and significantly different forms.  
This Part sets out these two forms and their conceptual differences.  The next 
  
11. The linguistic reference here is a purposeful nod to C. Wright Mills’s classic THE POWER 
ELITE (1956).  See also Margaret Canovan, Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of 
Democracy, 47 POL. STUD. 2, 5 (1999) (“Populists in established democracies claim they 
speak for the ‘silent majority’ of ‘ordinary, decent people’, whose interests and opinions are 
(they claim) regularly overridden by arrogant elites, corrupt politicians, and strident 
minorities.”). 
12. See Populism, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/ 
english/populism [https://perma.cc/MY47-7HK9]. 
13. Jan Jagers & Stefaan Walgrave, Populism as Political Communication Style: An Empirical 
Study of Political Parties’ Discourse in Belgium, 46 EUR. J. POL. RES. 319, 324 (2007) 
(identifying the many forms of populism across many dimensions of public life). 
14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 270 (James Madison) (Glazier & Co. ed., 1826). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259566 
Unbundling Populism 1487 
	
	
Part discusses how the more provocative—and more undesirable—form of 
populism is distorting our consideration of these ideologies. 
A. Unbundled Populism 
One version of populism features a claim of a mass of people competing 
against and unfairly losing to a narrow and secluded elite.  In a classic definition 
from 1956, Edward Shils defined populism as an “ideology of popular 
resentment against the order imposed on society by a long-established, 
differentiated, ruling class which is believed to have a monopoly of power, 
property, breeding and culture.”15  In a related and helpful definition in 2009, 
Robert R. Barr defined populism as “a mass movement led by an outsider or 
maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment 
appeals and plebiscitarian linkages.”16  In the modern theoretical literature, 
other conditions have been added to the concept of populism, but several 
features of this basic framework remain.  Cas Mudde’s important work has 
used features of this definition.17  Two recent and significant books on 
populism likewise feature similar definitions of populism as part of their 
definitions.18 
Empirical measures of support for populism as the dependent variable 
likewise feature this concept of a disempowered people competing against 
unjustly empowered elites.  One battery of questions measuring this concept 
asks how respondents feel that elites are actually and unjustly exercising 
outsized power.  Some questions commonly used to measure this include 
asking about agreement with the following statements: 
 
It doesn’t really matter who you vote for because the rich control both 
political parties. 
Politics usually boils down to a struggle between the people and the 
powerful.  
 
  
15. EDWARD A. SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY 100–01 (1956). 
16. Robert R. Barr, Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics, 15 PARTY POL. 29, 44 
(2009). 
17. See Cas Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 541, 543 (2004) (stating, 
among other things, that populism puts “the . . . people” versus “the corrupt elite”). 
18. See JUDIS, supra note 7, at 15 (describing populism as being about “a conflictual 
relationship” between “the people” and “the elite”); JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS 
POPULISM? 19–20 (2016) (defining populism as featuring the “people against elites”). 
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The system is stacked against people like me.  
People at the top usually get there . . . from some unfair advantage.19 
 
Another dimension measures distrust of elites placed into their position 
because of a technical expertise.  Some questions commonly used to measure 
sentiments towards this include: “I’d rather put my trust in the wisdom of 
ordinary people than the opinions of experts and intellectuals”; “When it comes 
to really important questions, scientific facts don’t help very much”; and 
“Ordinary people are perfectly capable of deciding for themselves what’s true 
and what’s not.”20 
The simpler unbundled populism is defined as both a style and a 
substance.  As a style, populism prioritizes speaking for the people by speaking 
to the people.  Democratic institutions are increasingly making politics into 
something like a technical profession, defined by the capacity of a few to claim 
jurisdiction by virtue of their specialized expertise.21  Political claims are 
thought to involve sophisticated arguments made in a stoic fashion.  For the 
populist, institutions have become too complicated and too distant, and 
therefore too difficult to understand, and the populist style promises to render 
these institutions legible.22  Populism values political arguments that are clear, 
comprehensible, and often emotional.23 
  
19. See Oliver & Rahn, supra note 9, at 197; Adam M. Enders & Steven Smallpage, Racial 
Prejudice, Not Populism or Authoritarianism, Predicts Support for Trump Over Clinton, 
WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (May 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/26/these-9-simple-charts-show-how-donald-trumps-supporters-
differ-from-hillary-clintons/?utm_term=.64215f91d49e [https://perma.cc/8HT9-8K56].  
For similar questions, see Brian Rathbun et al., This New Poll Shows that Populism Doesn’t 
Stem from People’s Economic Distress, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/19/this-new-poll-
shows-that-populism-doesnt-stem-from-economic-distress/?utm_term=.7a17d8ffb2bb 
[https://perma.cc/BLZ8-ELDE]. 
20. Oliver & Rahn, supra note 9, at 197–98. 
21. See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 11 (2016) (repeating the claim made by 
others that “populism is simple; democracy is complex”).  For a helpful overview of this as 
a central definition of what a profession is, see generally ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF 
PROFESSIONS (1988). 
22. This is often referred to as the Bagehot problem, identified by political theorist Margaret 
Canovan as a feature of populism and located in her work by her references to the British 
theorist Walter Bagehot.  Democratic institutions can become sufficiently complex that 
they become incoherent to most citizens of those democracies.  See Margaret Canovan, 
Populism for Political Theorists?, 9 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 241, 244–45 (2004); see also Huq, 
supra note 7, at 1133–44 (discussing this problem). 
23. For good theoretical treatments of the style of populism, see generally Canovan, supra note 
22; Benjamin Moffitt & Simon Tormey, Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and 
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The improvised style of populism is a costly signal to ordinary citizens to 
help them identify authentic political figures that will explain these institutions 
to the people they are meant to serve.24  Speaking in and with those institutions 
but in a style that can be comprehended more broadly runs the risk of 
alienating those institutions by not speaking in their linguistic code.  Enduring 
this stylistic cost for the sake of making political institutions more broadly 
comprehensible is a signal to ordinary citizens that the populist claims-maker 
cares about them.  Any figure that can only discuss the issues of the day in a way 
that is incomprehensible to the people of the day does not truly understand the 
concerns of the people. 
Unbundled populism’s style of speaking to the people has a rich lineage 
and contemporary support.  It was Andrew Jackson’s mass circulation 
biography, The Life of Jackson, that marked him as a stylistic populist.25  It is 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s appearances in locations open to the general public 
and her stylistic capacity to communicate to that public that led me to call her in 
an earlier article, “The People’s Justice.”26 
Unbundled populism is also a policy agenda, albeit one often paired with a 
more traditional “host ideology” (on a more traditional left-right spectrum)27 
that aspires to rectify injustices that empowered elites created for the rest of the 
people.  In this sense, populism does not fit the standard ideological definitions 
of the contemporary political left or political right.  On the political left in the 
United States, Occupy Wall Street rallied with a slogan, “We are the 99 
percent.”28  On the political right, Tea Party Republicans provide as one of the 
  
Political Style, 62 POL. STUD. 381 (2014).  For efforts to measure the use of a populist style 
through content analysis, see generally Bart Bonikowski & Noam Gidron, The Populist 
Style in American Politics: Presidential Campaign Discourse, 1952–1996, 94 SOC. FORCES 
1593 (2016). 
24. See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON 355, 361–68 (1973) (presenting a 
basic model that explains how those on the demand side evaluate good types and bad types 
on the supply side). 
25. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 131–34 (1955). 
26. See David Fontana, The People’s Justice?, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 447, 448 (2014) (“Sotomayor 
has made a large number of appearances at events geared toward [public] 
audiences . . . [and] has used these appearances (and her best-selling book) to discuss her 
life—and the law—in a less academic fashion.”). 
27. See Bert N. Bakker et. al., The Psychological Roots of Populist Voting: Evidence from the 
United States, the Netherlands and Germany, 55 EUR. J. POL. RES. 302, 303 (2016) 
(“Populism can be combined with many different ‘host ideologies.’”). 
28. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Occupy Wall Street: A Frenzy That Fizzled, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Sept. 17, 2012, 8:51 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/occupy-
wall-street-a-frenzy-that-fizzled [https://perma.cc/9W2S-RZ6Q]. 
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justifications for libertarianism the corruption of governments by elites.29  One 
study found that populism—even when defined more broadly than just the 
unbundled version—did not predict support for President Donald J. Trump.30 
The concern about ordinary citizens being ignored and misunderstood by 
a disconnected elite has a constitutional lineage in the United States, even if a 
complicated and conflicted one.  James Madison decried political parties as 
tools of political elites to suppress common sense—and common sentiment.  
Madison wrote of political parties in Federalist No. 10 as a “disease.”31  
Members of the House of Representatives were to be selected every two years32  
to ensure they were connected to regular people.  This was because, as Madison 
wrote in Federalist No. 52, these officials “should have a common interest with 
the people . . . [and] an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy 
with[] the people.”33  U.S. Supreme Court Justices rode circuit to keep them in 
touch “with the ordinary transactions of business.”34  There were not many 
executive officials at the Founding, but many of them were located outside of 
Washington to remove them from undue influence by a narrow political elite.35  
If practices like this were not sufficient, then the fact that each of the three 
branches of the federal government were granted discrete but also overlapping 
powers was meant to ensure that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract 
ambition” of those with political power.36 
Unbundled populism is also consistent with—and perhaps compelled by—
many of the leading scholarly trends of the past generation, particularly in 
constitutional law.  In the social sciences, the best-selling book of the past several 
years is the economist Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century.  
Piketty—described as a “rock star” by the New York Times because of the 
reception his ideas received37—analyzed the origins of massive economic 
  
29. See generally CHRISTOPHER S. PARKER & MATT A. BARRETO, CHANGE THEY CAN’T BELIEVE 
IN: THE TEA PARTY AND REACTIONARY POLITICS IN AMERICA (2013) (identifying how Tea 
Party ideology has focused on a supposedly narrow and corrupt group of people 
controlling the federal government). 
30. See Enders & Smallpage, supra note 19. 
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 14, at 51 (James Madison). 
32. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States.”).  
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 14, at 296 (James Madison). 
34. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 596 (1848) (featuring Senator George Badger’s 
statement as part of deliberations considering ending circuit riding). 
35.  See generally David Fontana, Federal Decentralization, 104 VA. L. REV. 727 (2018). 
36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 14, at 291 (James Madison). 
37. See Jennifer Schuessler, Economist Receives Rock Star Treatment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/19/books/thomas-piketty-tours-us-for-his-
new-book.html. 
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inequality.38  Nearly two-thirds of Americans think that these inequalities pose 
significant problems.39  The political science counterpart to Capital is Martin 
Gilens’s book on how policy outcomes reflect the preferences of the rich.  Gilens 
tells an empirical story of how the domination by economic elites turned them 
into dominant political elites as well.40  Elected officials at the state and federal 
level are increasingly from the same backgrounds, the same places, and the same 
schools.41 
Scholarly movements not only present elites as too powerful relative to 
rest of the country, but also have started to question the supposed technical 
expertise that justifies elite authority in many contexts.  Scholarship has 
started to argue what is now being tested as an element of populism: whether 
there is reason to question the “opinions of experts and intellectuals.”42  Law 
professors have started to engage with the motivated cognition literature’s 
findings that individuals are shaped in their worldviews by their underlying 
priors, including their priors related to legal issues.43  Scholars have found that 
experts—in law and otherwise—can be even more biased in the application of 
their skills than lay people.44  It was a bestselling book fourteen years ago—
  
38. See David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626, 629 (2014) 
(reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)). 
39. See Richard Wike, The Global Consensus: Inequality is a Major Problem, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/11/15/the-global-consensus-
inequality-is-a-major-problem/ [https://perma.cc/MT67-U8D8]. 
40. See generally MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND 
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012); id. at 1 (“The American government does respond to 
the public’s preferences, but that responsiveness is strongly tilter toward the most affluent 
citizens.”). 
41. See NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE-COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CLASS IN 
ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING (2013) (pulling together overall empirical evidence).  For the 
primary article leading to this important book, see generally Nicholas Carnes, Does the 
Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in Congress Matter?, 37 LEG. STUD. Q. 
5 (2012). 
42. Oliver & Rahn, supra note 9, at 197. 
43. See, e.g., David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence 
From a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 748 (2012).  Fontana & Braman 
write: 
Arguments that courts or legislatures are (or are not) distinctively competent to 
decide an issue are not just factual claims; they are also salvos in motivated battles 
over facts in the world.  Preferences regarding institutional choice are thus 
contingent on the values a citizen prioritizes and the social meaning a law or policy 
holds in relation to those worldviews. 
 Id. 
44. See generally John Gastil et al., The “Wildavsky Heuristic”: The Cultural Orientation of 
Mass Political Opinion (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 
107, 2005); Dan M. Kahan et al., The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons: Culture 
Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change 8 fig.3 (Cultural Cognition Project, 
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relying on many academic findings—that extolled “[t]he wisdom of 
crowds.”45 
Supreme Court Justices themselves come from an increasingly few 
number of places in the country, law schools, and professional backgrounds.46  
For the first time in over a hundred years, every single member of the Supreme 
Court can be placed on the ideological spectrum based on the political party of 
the president nominating them.47  The Supreme Court’s pro–big business 
orientation has been the subject of empirical48 and normative evaluation.49  The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC50 cleared the way for 
economic elites to control the political process by removing many limitations 
on corporate spending in elections.51  These justices not only appear more 
biased towards the powerful in outcome, but also perform their responsibilities 
  
Working Paper No. 89, 2011), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/296-kahan-tragedy-
of-the-riskperception1pdf [https://perma.cc/A2JG-NBXD]. 
45. See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER 
THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES 
AND NATIONS (2004).  
46. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2629 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Scalia writes: 
[T]his Court . . . [features] successful lawyers who studied at Harvard or Yale Law 
School.  Four of the nine are natives of New York City.  Eight of them grew up in 
east- and west-coast States.  Only one hails from the vast expanse in-between.  Not 
a single Southwesterner or even, to tell the truth, a genuine Westerner (California 
does not count).  Not a single evangelical Christian (a group that comprises about 
one quarter of Americans), or even a Protestant of any denomination. 
 Id.  See also, e.g., Kiran Dhillon, The Most Popular Law Schools of Supreme Court Justices, 
TIME (May 8, 2014), http://time.com/91646/the-most-popular-law-schools-of-supreme-
court-justices [https://perma.cc/G7FM-7B3E]; Past U.S. Supreme Court Members, 
INFOPLEASE, https://www.infoplease.com/history-and-government/supreme-court/past-us-
supreme-court-members [https://perma.cc/6Z27-ZH8B]. 
47. See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Split Definitive, SLATE (Nov. 11, 2011, 5:27 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/11/supreme_court_
s_partisan_divide_and_obama_s_health_care_law.html [https://perma.cc/HM9H-KU4J]. 
48. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the 
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1472 (2013) (“Whether measured by decisions or 
Justices’ votes, a plunge in warmth toward business during the 1960s (the heyday of the 
Warren Court) was quickly reversed; and the Roberts Court is much friendlier to business 
than either the Burger or Rehnquist Courts, which preceded it, were.”). 
49. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, 962 
(2008) (“[T]he Roberts Court is the most pro-business Court of any since the mid–
1930s.”); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES: MAG. (Mar. 16, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html (“The Supreme Court 
term that ended last June was, by all measures, exceptionally good for American 
business.”). 
50. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
51. Id. at 311 (deciding that some limitations on corporate participation in campaigns were 
unconstitutional). 
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by writing increasingly long and increasingly complicated opinions that are 
comprehensible only to a narrow few.  Two important books—one published 
and one forthcoming52—have connected the increasingly greater power 
exercised by increasingly fewer elites to constitutional law.  Indeed, it was just 
fourteen years ago that legal scholars were focused on “populist” claims by 
Larry Kramer53 (and others like Mark Tushnet54) that the Court was essentially 
too elite to have an exclusive power over judicial review. 
If there is any doubt about how much this unbundled populism had 
captured the minds of constitutional law professors, consider that several of 
them have ridden their scholarly message in law reviews and legal books to 
political careers.  Elizabeth Warren, primarily a bankruptcy scholar, focused on 
how elites distorted bankruptcy law to benefit the few over the many, and noted 
the constitutional implications of those arguments.55  Warren used those 
findings to move from Harvard law professor to U.S. senator and now a 
potential future presidential candidate.  Several years later, Zephyr Teachout, a 
Fordham law professor whose research focused on Citizens United and political 
inequalities, used her scholarship about the problems with elite power to run 
for governor of New York, a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, and then 
Attorney General of the State of New York.56 
  
52. See GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 12 (2017) (arguing that in moments of great control 
by narrow elites that the people “might turn to a demagogue who would overthrow the 
government—only to become a tyrant.  Oligarchy or tyranny, economic inequality meant 
the end of the republic”); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, 
and the Constitution of Opportunity, in WEALTH: NOMOS LVIII 45, 45 (Jack Knight & 
Melissa Schwartzberg eds., 2017) (previewing the arguments in their forthcoming book by 
arguing that “[a]s structures of opportunity grow more narrow and brittle and class 
inequalities mount, our nation is becoming what reformers throughout the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries meant when they talked about a society with a ‘moneyed 
aristocracy’ or a ‘ruling class’—an oligarchy, not a republic”). 
53. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of Law in a 
Populist Age, 96 TEX. L. REV. 487, 539 & n.231 (2018) (discussing Kramer’s book as 
invoking “an anti-elitist, populist sensibility”).  See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
54. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) 
(arguing that judicial review systematically insufficiently considers certain interests). 
55. See Suzanna Andrews, The Woman Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR: HIVE (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/11/elizabeth-warren-201111 (discussing 
Warren’s work).   
56. See Thomas Frank, Zephyr Teachout’s “Corruption in America,” N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/books/review/zephyr-teachouts-corruption-in-
america.html (discussing Teachout); William Neuman, In Upstate Congressional Race, a 
“Classic Boxers’ Match” That is Virtually Tied, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/nyregion/zephyr-teachout-john-faso-new-york-
congressional-district-race.html (discussing Teachout’s congressional campaign) Editorial 
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B. Bundled Populism 
This unbundled version of populism is simply insufficient to explain our 
current political moment.  Something else—something more—is happening 
now that was not happening previously.  Scholars have therefore bundled into 
the definition of populism a number of other criteria.  In bundled populism, 
antiestablishment views are now also bundled together with conceptually 
distinct authoritarian and xenophobic worldviews.57 
First, bundled populism has a different conception of the 
antiestablishment claims of populism.  Rather than conceptualizing the people 
as a disempowered people against a narrow, unjustly overpowered elite, the 
people and the elite are treated—by definition by bundled populism—as 
internally coherent.  The people are defined not only as the statistically 
dominant but neglected demographic in a country, but also as both 
“homogeneous” and “virtuous.”58  The “people” could include the nation, the 
voters, the peasants, or the proletariat, but the essential point is that there are 
many of them and that they are identical.59  The elites are not just exercising 
excessive power but are “arrogant, greedy, lazy, corrupt, unresponsive to 
ordinary people, and absorbed by self-interest.”60 
Bundled populism is therefore identified as espousing popular 
sovereignty at the expense of democratic values.61  It features what Jan-Werner 
Müller has described as a moralized antipluralism, premised on the idea that 
  
Board, Opinion, The New York Times Endorses Zephyr Teachout for Attorney General in 
Thursday’s Primary, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/19/ 
opinion/zephyr-teachout-new-york-attorney-general.html;. 
57. See, e.g., Inglehart & Norris, supra note 9, at 6 (noting Mudde’s influential definition that a 
“populist philosophy is a loose set of ideas that share three core features: anti-
establishment, authoritarianism, and nativism”); see generally Oliver & Rahn, supra note 9 
(using this definition of populism to test it empirically). 
58. The influential definition by Mudde, for instance, reflects this conception of populism.  See 
Mudde, supra note 17, at 543 (defining populism as “an ideology that considers society to 
be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ 
versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
volonté générale (general will) of the people”); see also Huq, supra note 7, at 1135–36 
(noting the problems with adding the “general will” concept to the definition of populism). 
59. See MARGARET CANOVAN, POPULISM (1981); PAUL A. TAGGART, POPULISM (2000). 
60. Bakker et al., supra note 27, at 306. Bakker summarizes the sense of bundled populism in 
his article.  See id.; MÜLLER, supra note 7, at 19–20 (stating that populism features “a 
particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that 
sets a morally pure and fully unified . . . people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in 
some other way morally inferior.” (emphasis omitted)). 
61. See Canovan, supra note 11; Mudde, supra note 17.  
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the particular political faction “alone[] represent[s] the people.”62  If there are 
two groups and only one is morally legitimate (that is, “the people”), then only 
one should rule, and the other group need not be protected.  Many empiricists 
testing individual preferences for populism therefore utilize authoritarianism 
modules.63 
Bundled populism features not just antiliberalism, but xenophobia as well.  
Defining populism to feature homogeneous people means that the people must 
aggressively ward off anyone threatening to intrude on their homogeneity.  
Right-wing bundled populism has targeted immigrants as threatening the 
homogeneity of the people.  Left-wing bundled populism has not targeted 
immigrants to the same degree.64  Some scholars have therefore argued that this 
xenophobia is a feature of right-wing populism alone.65  Left-wing populism in 
Europe, however, is often bundled.  Pim Fortuyn, a Dutch populist a generation 
ago, argued that the absence of support for gay rights was what made Muslims 
unfit for Dutch society.66  In many places in Western Europe, left-wing bundled 
populists argue that the elite have coopted the social democratic state for 
improper uses, taking it away from ordinary citizens.67  Bundled populism in 
Latin America has targeted American imperialism as a threat to the 
homogeneous “people” in different Latin American countries (most notably 
  
62. MÜLLER, supra note 7, at 3; see also id. at 69 (stating that the populist believes that rule by 
any faction other than the people “amount[s] to mere administration or cooptation into 
existing political and social arrangements”). 
63. See Wendy Rahm & Eric Oliver, Trump’s Voters Aren’t Authoritarians, New Research Says.  
So What Are They?, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Mar. 9, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/09/trumps-voters-
arent-authoritarians-new-research-says-so-what-are-they/?utm_term=.2d0df8789116 
[https://perma.cc/7L24-LRZA] (testing preferences for authoritarianism as related to 
preferences for populism). 
64. See Cas Mudde & Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: 
Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America, 48 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 147 (2013) 
(discussing how not all forms of populism equally target immigrants).  
65. See e.g., CAS MUDDE, POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE (2007); TAGGART, supra 
note 59.  
66. See Andrew Osborn, Dutch Fall for Gay Mr. Right, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2002), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/14/andrewosborn.theobserver 
[https://perma.cc/ G7CW-HT2D]. 
67. See Gijs Schumacher & Kees van Kersbergen, Do Mainstream Parties Adapt to the Welfare 
Chauvinism of Populist Parties, 22 PARTY POL. 300 (2014) (discussing the populist appeals 
of certain Western European democratic parties and examining how some populists 
support the social democratic state but argue that its animating purposes are being 
undermined through the alleged misdirection of resources).  
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Venezuela under Hugo Chávez).68  Andrew Jackson attacked the Second Bank 
of the United States for having too many foreign investors.69 
II. THE PROBLEMS OF POPULISM PROLIFERATION 
These two ideologies are clearly different in theory and in practice.  With 
so much separating them, why unify them with a single, powerful label?  This 
Part argues that labeling both ideologies as populist generates unnecessary 
research confusion and political harms. 
A. Conceptual 
Bundled populism either does not need to be primarily called populism as 
opposed to other labels, or it need not be called populism at all.  First, the fact 
that bundled populism is primarily called populism is unnecessary and 
unhelpful from the perspective of research design.70  Let’s assume—as 
substantial evidence does suggest—that bundled populism is correct to treat 
its three dimensions of political perspectives as logically and empirically 
related.  Scholars wishing to describe the current reality of bundled populism 
across the globe would be (rightfully) criticized if they excluded the 
authoritarian or xenophobic dimensions from their analysis.  If a scholar 
discussed Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of Hungary’s political brand without 
mentioning his destruction of democratic institutions, it would seem as if 
something substantial was missing.71  If a scholar tried to discuss President 
Donald J. Trump’s political brand without discussing his bigotry,72 it would be 
hard to take their arguments seriously. 
  
68. Kirk Hawkins, Populism in Venezuela: The Rise of Chavismo, 24 THIRD WORLD Q. 1137 
(2003) (discussing how Hugo Chavez targeted foreign intervention as deserving of scorn). 
69. See Andrew Jackson and the National Bank, WORLD HIST. (May 22, 2017), 
https://worldhistory.us/american-history/andrew-jackson-and-the-national-bank.php 
[https://perma.cc/XBC3-T226]. 
70. For helpful guidance on how to define a concept, see generally the classic article written by 
Giovanni Sartori, Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
1033 (1970). 
71. For more on Orbán’s actions, see generally Joanna Fomina & Jacek Kucharczyk, Populism 
and Protest in Poland, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 58 (2016). 
72. See, e.g., Michelle Yee He Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting Mexican 
Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-
immigrants-and-crime/?utm_term=.af256f0b0ed6 [https://perma.cc/T8EM-AQAN] 
(“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best.  They’re not sending you.  
They’re not sending you.  They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re 
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Why, then, do scholars so often label this phenomenon by just one 
dimension (populism) to the exclusion of the others?  None of the three dimen-
sions seems to be logically or empirically driving the other dimensions and 
therefore deserving of being the title for all of the other dimensions.  Xenophobic 
sentiments can mobilize antiestablishment or antidemocratic sentiments and 
have in the past few years.73  Why not call bundled populism authoritarianism?  
Or racism?  Or some combination that mutes the exclusivity of populism—such 
as authoritarian populism? 
Second, linking together the antiestablishment dimension of bundled 
populism to the authoritarian and xenophobic dimensions is questionable—or at 
least in need of more empirical evidence.  The mechanism linking together 
populism and the other dimensions is presumably that the nature of ideological 
preferences by populists makes populists view opponents in moralized terms, 
and views opponents as morally inferior and therefore undeserving of equal 
political status.74 
If we substituted polarization for populism, would we not see a similar 
linkage with authoritarian and xenophobic sentiments?  Is it just the intensity of 
the populist preference that matters rather than that it is a populist preference?  
Polarization generates powerful ingroup and outgroup mechanisms that make 
opponents distant and different, and therefore undeserving of an equal political 
status and even undeserving of equal human or moral status.75  Polarization—
regardless of which ideologies are being polarized—results in one’s political 
opponents being deemed not just as political opponents but as moral enemies.  
The affective polarization literature in the social sciences demonstrates—even 
  
bringing those problems with us.  They’re bringing drugs.  They’re bringing crime.  
They’re rapists.  And some, I assume, are good people.”). 
73. The political scientist Michael Tesler has conducted excellent empirical work 
demonstrating that xenophobia (particularly racist sentiments) drove political preferences 
in 2008 and 2012—and even more in 2016.  See generally MICHAEL TESLER, POST-RACIAL OR 
MOST RACIAL?  RACE AND POLITICS IN THE OBAMA ERA (2016).  For a discussion of the 2016 
U.S. presidential election, see Michael Tesler, Views About Race Mattered More in Electing 
Trump Than in Electing Obama, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Nov. 22, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/22/peoples-views-
about-race-mattered-more-in-electing-trump-than-in-electing-obama/?utm_term= 
.ccd07ba26d8d [https://perma.cc/NGB8-QPFU]. 
74. See MÜLLER, supra note 7, at 3, 31–32 (describing populism as dismissing opponents as 
“immoral and not properly a part of the people at all” and as featuring a “moralized 
antipluralism”). 
75. Classic findings in this genre include Carl I. Hovland & Walter Weiss, The Influence of 
Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness, 15 PUB. OPINION Q. 635 (1951–52),  
and Irving Lorge & Carl C. Curtiss, Prestige, Suggestion, and Attitudes, 7 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
386 (1936).  
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before Trump won in 2016—how much Democrats and Republicans now see 
supporters of the other party as not deserving of equal status in the political 
system.76  Large numbers of Americans of both parties would be “displeased” if 
their child married someone from the opposing political party.77  Supermajorities 
of Americans of both parties would be disinclined to hire someone from the 
opposing political party.78 
If the argument is that populism is somehow different from other 
examples of polarized ideological disputes, then the argument is that there is 
something distinctive about the internal ideological structure of populism that 
makes it more authoritarian and xenophobic.  Jan-Werner Müller makes an 
argument like this in his important book, describing arguments using “the 
people” and “the elite” as “volatile, risky, maybe outright dangerous 
expression[s].”79  What is it about using the phrase “the people” that 
dangerously excludes certain groups from the political process?  Political causes 
frequently make arguments targeting specific subgroups.80  These appeals are 
crucial to prime supporters to mobilize and to act in the political system.  Are 
appeals based on criticizing “forces of greed” taking from “a forgotten middle 
class” (Bill Clinton)81 or talking about “a billionaire class” (Bernie Sanders)82 
somehow less motivating than talking about “the people”?  What about when 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt justified massive changes to the country 
by talking about the “average man” versus the “economic royalists”?83  These 
were all appeals identifying some subgroups as wrongly dispossessed compared 
to other subgroups.   
  
76. For a good frame and discussion of this literature about polarization, see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Partyism, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 1, 1 (2015) (stating that partyism “is a form of 
hostility and prejudice that operates across political lines”). 
77. Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood & Yphtach Lelkes, Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity 
Perspective on Polarization, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. 405, 417 (2012). 
78. See Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New 
Evidence on Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 697–701 (2015) (providing results 
of a study demonstrating how people do not like to pick ideological opponents for 
anything, including nonpolitical tasks). 
79. MÜLLER, supra note 7, at 71. 
80. See Eitan D. Hersh & Brian F. Schaffner, Targeted Campaign Appeals and the Value of 
Ambiguity, 75 J. POL. 520 (2013). 
81. William J. Clinton, President, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the 
Democratic National Convention in New York (July 16, 1992), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25958 [https://perma.cc/SG9U-AX8C]. 
82. Bernie Sanders, Opinion, How Democrats Can Stop Losing Elections, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/bernie-sanders-how-democrats-
can-stop-losing-elections.html. 
83. See JUDIS, supra note 7, at 32. 
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B. Political 
1. Unbundled Populism 
Unbundled populism is left without the capacity to escape bundled 
populism, or the capacity to fight it to construct a more perfect populism.  
Unbundled populism is—to quote Albert Hirschman’s famous writing—
without exit or voice.84  Unbundled populism cannot exit populism because it 
needs the label populism as an organizing frame.  At the same time, unbundled 
populism is left without voice to shape what the term populism means because 
of the louder microphone that bundled populism holds.  The result is that 
unbundled populism is dismissed and demeaned by association, making it into 
a caged intellectual force that feels wrongfully ignored. 
Unbundled populism cannot exit from the populism debate because it 
needs a frame to motivate and organize its actual and potential supporters.  If a 
massive number of individuals are going to organize to displace an excessively 
powerful elite, they face significant free-rider problems.85  One means of 
overcoming these problems is to generate frames—or messages—for their 
cause that unifies proponents.  Frames produce and maintain “meaning for 
constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers.”86  Frames succeed to 
the degree that they resonate with potential supporters.87  The populist frame is 
an unavoidable one because it goes to the very ideological core of what 
unbundled populism advocates. 
Unbundled populism must therefore answer for bundled populism 
because they share the same populism label.  In the United States, that means 
associating oneself with the Know-Nothings of the 1840s—often labeled as 
populist—and their bigoted targeting of immigrants.88  In Latin America, it 
means associating oneself with Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina and his 
  
84. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (describing how participants can exit a collective or 
use their voice within the collective as a means of exercising power). 
85. For the classic statement of this problem, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 46–48, 156–57 (1965). 
86. Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 613 (2000) (citation omitted). 
87. See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 814 (2008) (“The key insight of framing theory, 
then, is that the existence and success of collective action is affected . . . by the ability of 
social actors to frame problems and solutions . . . to ‘align’ their frames with those used by 
potential adherents and bystanders.”). 
88. For the classic account of this period, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 131–
34 (1955).   
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persecution of political opponents and support of fascism.89  In Europe, it 
means associating oneself with the French National Front and its Holocaust 
denialism and anti-Muslim platforms.90 
But unbundled populism cannot speak back to the pathologies of bundled 
populism because bundled populism saturates the media environment with its 
message.  Media in all of its forms has a greater commercial orientation than 
previously.91  Media outlets face greater and greater pressure to reach more and 
more customers.  Trump’s comments about a Mexican judge92 and the position 
of the Law and Justice Party in Poland regarding the Holocaust93 generate more 
outrage, and therefore more eyeballs, than other forms of populist comments 
such as the fact that members of Congress are no longer from working class 
backgrounds.94  When unbundled populism can obtain a microphone to lay a 
claim on populism, it must fight against the notion that authoritarianism and 
xenophobia are not just characteristic of one form of populism, but of all forms 
of populism.95  It must fight the notion that unbundled populism does not 
count as populism.96 
The absence of exit or voice means that unbundled populism is without 
sufficient influence in the political process in the democracies trying to squelch 
it.  But the problem is not just that unbundled populism loses out, but also how 
it loses out.  The association of unbundled populism with bundled populism 
causes people to reject the former by demeaning it.  The result is a constant—
and constantly problematic—dynamic that crowds out unbundled populism 
  
89. See generally DAVID ROCK, ARGENTINA, 1516–1982 (1987). 
90. See JUDIS, supra note 7, at 98–102 (discussing how these versions of populism dominate the 
European debate). 
91. See Fritz Plasser & Peter A. Ulram, Striking a Responsive Chord: Mass Media and Right-
Wing Populism in Austria, in THE MEDIA AND NEO-POPULISM: A CONTEMPORARY 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 21 (Gianpietro Mazzoleni et al. eds., 2003) (discussing how media 
concentration produced populism in Austria). 
92. See Brent Kendall, Trump Says Judge’s Mexican Heritage Presents ‘Absolute Conflict,’ WALL 
ST. J. (June 3, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keeps-up-attacks-on-
judge-gonzalo-curiel-1464911442 [https://perma.cc/2XJB-CV7K]. 
93. See Marc Santora, Poland’s President Supports Making Some Holocaust Statements A 
Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/06/world/europe/poland-holocaust-law.html 
(discussing a law that would make it a crime to accuse “the Polish nation” of any role in the 
Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities). 
94. See Carnes, supra note 41.  
95. See MÜLLER, supra note 7, at 2–3 (“[I]t is a necessary but not sufficient condition to be 
critical of elites in order to count as a populist. . . .  [P]opulists are always antipluralist.”). 
96. See id. at 20 (“The core claim of populism is thus a moralized form of antipluralism.  
Political actors not committed to this claim are simply not populists.”). 
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from the necessary role it should enjoy as part of the public discourse of the 
world’s democracies. 
Unbundled populism is demeaned because people treat it as featuring the 
silly, simplified antiestablishment claims made by the more provocative 
bundled populism.  Scholars define bundled populism not just as highlighting 
that a narrow and corrupt elite is suppressing a broad and morally undervalued 
majority, but as necessarily involving a “homogenous” people and elite.97  How 
can any theory be taken seriously if it is defining hundreds of millions of people 
as identical—as “homogenous?”  Populism is also defined simplistically by 
allegedly claiming that the people are “pure.”98  Again, how can any theory be 
taken seriously by academics if hundreds of millions of people are defined as 
morally flawless? 
Scholars likewise dismiss the claims of unbundled populism that 
communications should be more simplified and more emotionally resonant.  
The fact that populist leaders are appealing to voters in a more accessible 
fashion is viewed as bound together with their authoritarian and xenophobic 
behaviors.  Hugo Chávez, for instance, hosted a weekly television program in 
Venezuela entitled Aló Presidente.99  Viktor Orbán appears on radio most 
Fridays to reach voters.100  Beppe Grillo of the Five Star Movement in Italy has a 
blog which he uses to communicate directly to voters.101  Many scholars focus 
so much on the messages that Chávez, Orbán or Grillo are advocating that they 
demean the medium that they are using to communicate it.  They dismiss 
talking to the people as a “curious kind of political folklore.”102  Or consider, 
closer to home, the disdainful reaction to the fact that President Donald J. 
Trump uses Twitter, rather than to what he says on Twitter.103  Twitter is 
  
97. See, e.g., Mudde, supra note 17, at 543. 
98. See id. 
99. See MÜLLER, supra note 7, at 43; Rachel Nolan, The Realest Reality Show in the World, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 4, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/magazine/hugo-chavezs-
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100. See MÜLLER, supra note 7, at 43; see, e.g., Tom Szigetti, Victor Orbán on Trump, Brexit, and 
EU Migration, HUNGARY TODAY (Nov. 11, 2016), https://hungarytoday.hu/firebrand-chat-
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102. Id. at 43. 
103. For examples in the media, see, for instance, Kathy Gilsinan & Uri Friedman, Donald 
Trump’s Asymmetric War on the Establishment, ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/trump-asymmetric-war-
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portrayed as superficial and silly, not a medium of communication for anyone 
who cares about the message.  
2. Bundled Populism 
Simply labeling bundled populism as any form of populism legitimates it 
as a kind of populism.104  It legitimates it in the first place simply by considering 
bundled populism as a principled perspective deserving of an ideological label.  
Scholars and others consider whether it is a desirable way to look at the world, 
rather than questioning in the first place whether it is a way to look at the 
world at all.  It is certainly possible—if not probable—that the commitment to 
restoring the power of the people relative to the elite advocated by bundled 
populism is “cheap talk” undeserving of an ideological label.105 
The scholarly debate about populism, until recently, has been dominated 
by first-rate political theorists and intellectual historians.106  Because of the 
domination of those fields, political figures espousing populist ideologies were 
taken to mean what they say.  The scholarly debates were about the internal 
merits of the ideas rather than the sincerity of those espousing them.  The 
limited but helpful empirical research into the causes and effects of populism 
has taken the conceptual definitions provided by these scholars on their own 
terms by analyzing rhetorical uses of populist claims instead of insincere and 
costly policy manifestations of these claims.107 
Stating support for the people against the elite can cover not just for 
inconsistent ideological perspectives, but for ideological perspectives that are 
completely opposed to populism.  Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Geert Wilders, 
two leading European populists, have served for decades in national elected 
politics, not exactly fitting the profiles of supporters of the people against elites.  
Likewise, Trump won every major income group that is above the national 
income average in the 2016 presidential election, and lost every major income 
group below the national average in that election.108  Rather than being 
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104. See MÜLLER, supra note 7, at 50–51 (noting how many of those politicians dominating the 
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105. See Vincent Crawford, A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk, 78 J. 
ECON. THEORY 286, 286 (1998) (“[T]alk is cheap in the sense that players’ messages have no 
direct payoff implications . . . .”). 
106. See MÜLLER, supra note 7; Canovan, supra note 11; Mudde, supra note 17. 
107. See, e.g., Bonikowski & Gidron, supra note 23.  
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committed to the people against the elites, lawsuits have raised legitimate 
questions about whether his motivations are less ideological and more about 
personal enrichment.109  The late Alabama governor George Wallace, another 
political figure often labeled as populist, lost massive amounts of political support 
once unions informed Alabama voters how much his policies really favored the 
elite over the people rather than the other way around.110 
Labeling these political figures and their political claims as populist 
legitimates the figures and their claims also by not labeling them as something 
else.  It is equally possible that bundled populism could be called authoritarianism.  
Or it could be labeled xenophobia.  In those situations, not only is the focus on 
something less morally sympathetic than populism, but even the populism 
dimension of unbundled populism becomes something to question rather than 
something to embrace.  Can an authoritarian be a populist?  Can a racist be a 
populist? 
Labeling bundled populism as populism also legitimates it by providing it 
with a usable past.  It saddles unbundled populists with the problematic legacy 
of populist figures like Father Coughlin, Joseph McCarthy, or George Wallace.  
But it also helps them by affiliating them with the more appealing elements of 
the platform of the Populist Party and the social democratic reforms that their 
efforts eventually yielded.111  As Jan-Werner Müller has written, the path-
ological ideologies that constitute bundled populism have “proudly claimed the 
label [populism] for themselves with the argument that, if populism means 
working for the people, then they are indeed populists.”112 
Labeling bundled populism as populism also legitimates problematic 
political figures and claims that came before the current populists on center 
stage.  For bundled populism to be so bad, everything that came before it needs 
to be so good.  In order to devise a concept of what populism is that makes 
current figures and claims coherent and connected, other figures and claims 
need to be distinguished.  The focus needs to be on what bundled populism 
does as the disease, rather than as the symptom of an underlying disease that 
predated it. 
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If bundled populism is uniquely defined by its antidemocratic tendencies, 
then such tendencies need to be eliminated from any understanding of what 
came before figures like Trump.  Other political leaders outside of bundled 
populists are therefore defined as “mak[ing] representative claims in the form 
of something like hypotheses that can be empirically disproven on the basis 
of . . . actual results.”113  Whatever one thinks of political leaders outside of any 
form of populism, it is hard to think of them as applying the scientific method 
in their campaigns and terms in office. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the key measures of success of any political figure is not just their 
ability to persuade, but their ability to distract.  Democracies are defined not 
just by what their leaders and their citizens prefer, but by what they prefer to 
discuss.  Successful political leaders do not just tell us how to think, but they tell 
us what to think about—and what to forget. 
It is difficult to remember what occupied public attention before the year 
of the populist, but it is worthwhile to do so.  In late 2013, Democratic President 
Barack Obama mentioned inequality—the gap between the many and the 
few—as the “defining challenge of our time.”114  During the midterm elections 
of 2014, Republicans agreed with Obama’s sentiment.115  That year, 
overwhelming majorities of both parties began to agree that our political and 
economic system was favoring the few over the many.116 
Then Donald J. Trump entered the presidential race in June of 2015, with 
his attention-grabbing flouting of norms that safeguard democracy and 
tolerance.  His rise during the presidential primaries and general election 
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during 2016 fit into a global narrative—alongside the continued success of 
figures like Le Pen in France and Orbán in Hungary—of a new politics pushing 
old countries in new directions.  We continued our old conversations about the 
few controlling the many, but also layered on top of that conversation—and 
distracting us from it—was a conversation about Mexicans being rapists 
(United States)117 and Muslim invaders destroying Western democracies 
(Hungary).118 
It is a feature of the success of these political figures that they not only 
distracted us from antiestablishment populism and turned our attention to 
authoritarian and xenophobic ideas, but that they did so through an act of 
appropriation.  New movements have been able to use old terms, and to use old 
terms with at worst morally ambiguous meanings, and at best, meanings that 
legitimate these new movements.  The year of the populist was the year of grand 
populist theft.  Trump and Le Pen and Orbán stole populism.  These figures 
were able to convince us that they are the populists, and that they are the 
rightful heirs to our conversation of the years prior about the few controlling 
the many.  While we might disagree whether populism is the frame through 
which we want to discuss the issues of our time, if it is going to be a frame, we 
need to make sure to police who gets to use that term—and who does not. 
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